



## The New Military Autonomy in Latin America

Consuelo Cruz and Rut Diamint

Latin America was once called a "living museum" because archaic elites never quite disappeared from the scene.<sup>1</sup> Instead, they became part of an "exhibit" which, far from being inert, actually ran the place. Now, on the eve of the twenty-first century, Latin America is more politically diverse and dynamic. The tanks that not too long ago roamed the streets have vanished from sight, military uniforms seem passé and coups obsolete, and the era of the generals appears finally to have been consigned to the archives.

Most observers and practitioners seem to agree that Latin American military governments are a thing of the past, and that the future will probably look like the present. The autonomy of the armed forces, according to this vision, will likely remain limited by the defeat or discrediting of the military. But a degree of autonomy will also remain guaranteed--by transition pacts in Chile and Uruguay; by a high degree of homogeneity among military and governing elites in Brazil; by the sheer debility of democratic control mechanisms, as in Paraguay and Nicaragua; and by historical settlements that long ago simultaneously imposed a low profile on the army and secured its place among state institutions, as in Mexico and Ecuador.<sup>2</sup>

This conventional view is neither particularly optimistic nor pessimistic, neither a best-case scenario (deep institutionalization of **[End Page 115]** civilian-democratic supremacy) nor the worst alternative (military insubordination). But it may not be realistic, either. For the ways and means of military autonomy are changing. Everywhere in the region, officers are metamorphosing into a combination of armed seigneurs (in increasingly unsafe societies) and soldiers-cum-entrepreneurs (in restructuring economies). They are crafting institutional and individual strategies to meet an expanded definition of "threats to national security," even as they take advantage of new opportunities to pursue profits. And the new democracies condone these trends in different ways, some more obvious than others, all pernicious in the end.

So disarming is the notion of the obsolescence of military rule that for the last decade it has led the region's political elites and civil society activists to neglect the balance between civilian-democratic authority and military autonomy. Domestic political actors repeat the old mistake of accommodating--with varying degrees of comfort--the military's self-insulation. Elected officials, in the main, favor streamlining military establishments; but after making resource allocations, they leave the armed forces to their own devices. Politicians tend to avoid the military question. And while civic associations multiply rapidly, they pursue particularistic agendas, which in any case are often shaped or reshaped by those same elected officials and politicians whose involvement in military matters, to say nothing of their leverage over the armed forces, is quite limited.

## Feudal Autonomy and Military Entrepreneurs

Democratic states, like all others, depend on organized coercive power. Hence the unavoidable need for armed forces endowed with sufficient institutional autonomy to perform their duties well. At the same time, democracies are democracies in part because their armed forces remain both functionally integrated with the state and subordinated to legitimate authority. Put another way, civilian authorities bar soldiers from making independent forays into civil and political society, or even into the international arena, and subject the military to the state's internal rules of accountability.

This bundle of prohibitions and allowances is at the core of "dedicated autonomy"--our term for the kind of autonomy that allows the military discretionary decision-making authority and reserved zones of expertise and action, but harnesses its institutional prerogatives to the service of a higher order that it does not determine. The 1960s and 1970s were dark times for Latin America precisely because militaries freed themselves from the prohibitions and controls imposed by civilians and enjoyed unbounded autonomy. But the end of the *unbounded* autonomy characteristic of military dictatorships does not necessarily mean that we can take for granted the establishment of the dedicated [End Page 116] autonomy so essential for a democratic order. The 1980s and 1990s may well turn out, instead, to be a prelude to the era of a new kind of civil-military relationship: *feudal* autonomy.

Latin American governments can claim some significant institutional accomplishments in the direction of reining in military autonomy. In the context of post-statist economic restructuring and postauthoritarian politics, reductions in military personnel and cuts in defense budgets serve to help rationalize public finances and to realign the balance between legitimate authority and organized coercive power. The Latin American democracies may be counted among the rationalizers and realigners of the late twentieth century. This is an unambiguously positive development. So too is the ideological and partisan neutrality proclaimed by military elites, not to mention the institutionalization of electoral politics. At the close of the millennium, most Latin American societies remain free of the armed Leviathan that stifled them not so long ago, and this is all to the good.

These gains notwithstanding, a close inspection of Latin American civil-military relations reveals disconcerting signs. Alfred Stepan has identified three areas of potential conflict between the armed forces and democratic governments. One area has to do with accountability for past human rights abuses. The other two areas, more germane to this essay, have to do with the policy-making processes whereby democratic political actors: 1) exert control over the military; and 2) establish criteria for the structuring of defense budgets and their post-allocation supervision.<sup>3</sup> We suggest that it is precisely in these last two areas that a process of "feudalization" may be under way among the armed forces of several Latin American countries.

Like medieval lords, the armed forces are becoming, all at once, guardians of their own limited autonomy, protectors for hire, and de facto guarantors of domestic order. Some of the conditions underlying this "retro-novelty" have deep roots in the region--most notably the corrupt police forces and weak judicial systems that handicap the democratic state. Others are of more recent origin. Over the last decade-and-a-half, economic stabilization and structural adjustment have been the democratic state's most urgent priority. Selected macroeconomic indicators suggest that the region's democracies have, in the main, met their goal. But widespread criminality and the persistence of organized violence also suggest that these democracies have inadequately managed the socioeconomic dislocations that follow from economic crisis and adjustment.

Indeed, the mutually reinforcing effects of institutional weaknesses and socioeconomic dislocations have gradually led to a crisis of democratic governability, one that had already become evident in the early 1990s. In Peru, to take a striking illustration, the Shining Path had by then become an informal provider of "social order" and "justice" [End Page 117] in the *barriadas* of Lima.<sup>4</sup> In Brazil, meanwhile, the majority of citizens expressed the belief that the state had not attempted and would

never attempt "to enforce laws on all citizens equally and impartially." <sup>5</sup>

The democratic state's continued incapacity has not been lost on private economic groups and even public managers, who now routinely make their own security arrangements by contracting miniature armies from the "professionals," which is to say the armed forces themselves. In Argentina, private and semi-private demand for protection has resulted in the proliferation of security firms that are privately owned and operated by military officers. Similarly, Colombian petroleum companies routinely avail themselves of security services provided--formally and informally--by the ministry of defense. <sup>6</sup>

If in Argentina and Colombia the military is now an entrepreneurial class with business interests of its own, <sup>7</sup> the cases of Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua are more blatant still. In Ecuador, the armed forces have set out to create a parallel "developmental" state that high-ranking officers claim will remedy national deficiencies in key economic sectors like banking, tele-communications, and transportation. <sup>8</sup> In Paraguay, Venezuela, and Honduras, officers are deeply involved in commercial ventures. In Guatemala, they are shareholders in important industries. In Nicaragua, they are major agricultural producers and highly competitive building contractors. <sup>9</sup>

This kind of military entrepreneurship is a novelty even in Central America, in that it is much more unabashed and formal than the parasitic business deals often associated with the unscrupulous armed forces of yore. In the age of economic liberalism, an officer's self-interested incursions into the market no longer seem an affront to the armed forces' professional code of conduct. In the age of budget-cutting, moreover, the military's institutional integrity, previously deemed incompatible with entrepreneurial activity, is now seen as dependent on it. Although direct control of government is considered off limits to the armed forces, not much else seems to be disallowed.

This enhancement of the military's sphere of action has both paradoxical and plainly deleterious consequences for political-economic reform. In the realm of the market itself, military entrepreneurship fosters unfair competition in two ways. First, military entrepreneurs are better positioned than their private-sector counterparts to influence official decision makers and, thereby, to extract information, concessions, and patronage from the state. Second, because military entrepreneurs control the infrastructure of the armed forces, they can reduce their own businesses' costs by making informal use of everything from military transport vehicles and telephone lines to clerical personnel.

In the political sphere, meanwhile, military entrepreneurship further weakens the democratic state. At the most obvious level, it enables **[End Page 118]** officers to procure independent revenue sources for themselves as individuals and for the military as an institution, thus reducing their dependence on the civilian government. At a more profound level, it expands the range of opportunistic strategies for the military--strategies that can culminate in destructive competition within the state itself. The armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and even Bolivia were initially reluctant to get involved in the war against drug trafficking. But in the face of budget cuts, they have done a *volte face*, on the (reasonable) expectation that involvement in this "war" will afford them greater access to foreign aid. The military's bid, in turn, has provoked a defensive reaction from police and security forces--traditionally embroiled in turf rivalries of their own. In Bolivia, the result has been an internal maze of obstructionist moves and counter-moves, as police, security, and military forces set out to enhance their respective domains by undermining one another's efficacy. <sup>10</sup>

The public image of the democratic state cannot afford further erosion. But the search for greater state efficacy can have potentially dangerous consequences, as in Brazil, where the armed forces, the police, and the security forces have undergone a process of formal and informal institutional blending. This process, which simultaneously strengthens the three bodies and gives the military additional leverage vis-'a-vis both elected governments and civil society, <sup>11</sup> has recently reached a new peak with the creation of the Agencia Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN). The principal task of ABIN, established under General Alberto Cardozo's leadership, is telling: to keep an eye on

"potentially dangerous" popular organizations and prevent their "political manipulation." <sup>12</sup>

## The Failure of Democratic Accountability

If the democratic state's public image continues to erode, so too will its ability to command the loyalty of social groups. But these allegiances will not remain unclaimed for long. Already, the armed forces--and no other single institution--appears capable of responding to society's clamor for public order and the protection of life and property.

That the military enjoys a favorable image should not surprise us. The armed forces in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia have become the main purveyors of security for important clients, who are then left beholden to their protectors. In addition, because democratic governments are plagued by weak law-enforcement, those same governments must rely on the military to manage social crises. Hence the view expressed by former Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada that "any president in Peru or Bolivia has to have a very close relationship with the armed forces." <sup>13</sup>  
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But a "very close relationship" between elected officials and the armed forces can take many forms, depending on the broader context. In most Latin American democracies, this context is partly set by political institutions and civil societies that lack both the capability and the will to impose strict control over their military establishments. Take an obvious starting point: the ministries of defense. Brazil has no defense minister. Nicaragua appointed one only in 1997. And in Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, either active or retired military officers occupy the post.

More importantly, while defense ministries play a formal role in decision-making processes related to military budget allocations, ministerial monitoring is reduced to little more than a fiction once disbursements have been made. This is true even in countries where civilians serve as defense ministers. In Argentina and Chile, for instance, they exercise limited influence in shaping either the patterns of military expenditure and investment, or the profile of military appointments and promotions. <sup>14</sup>

Other institutional factors hinder democratic control over the military. Most notably, legislative oversight is virtually nonexistent. Like the ministries of defense, legislatures have a say in assigning resources, but they are routinely left in the dark about their subsequent application. <sup>15</sup>

Civil society also remains inattentive to matters having to do with the military's prerogatives. Societal actors, to be sure, have discovered the merits of civic association. In Mexico, for example, there has been an explosion of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). But there, as elsewhere in Latin America, NGOs understandably define their tasks in discrete terms--women's rights, environmental protection, indigenous concerns. <sup>16</sup> And as elsewhere in the region, NGOs have become dependent for visibility and leverage on political parties and congressional actors.

In South America, this dependency hooks NGOs to legislatures and organized parties that lack both the investigative machinery and the political will required for effective oversight of the military. In Mexico, where the impartiality of military tribunals is highly questionable, oversight becomes all the more problematic (witness the longstanding, symbiotic arrangements between high-ranking officers and the drug cartels). In addition, although the Mexican Supreme Court has opened up the possibility for individual citizens to seek protection from military abuse by appealing to the civil judicial system, the fact remains that ministerial officials charged with the task of investigating such appeals prefer to turn a blind eye. <sup>17</sup> We might call the ultimate result "layered impunity": The abuse of citizens' rights is compounded by officials' tacit disregard of court mandates, which in turn is capped by the court's inability to enforce its own rulings. **[End Page 120]**

These institutional problems find expression in a lack of political will. Politicians across the board show a marked disinclination to press the armed forces for greater accountability, with the result that

political parties have no working teams specifically assigned to develop positions on security and defense issues. Nor is there any noticeable executive-legislative cooperation aimed at a serious rethinking of the relationship among public safety, national security, and defense in the radically altered context of a democratic state.

## Civic Actors in Uniform

These institutional, political, and civic weaknesses stand in sharp contrast to the effectiveness of the armed forces' own "civic action" projects, which not only enhance the military's outreach capacity, but also allow it to build and develop clientelistic bases of support. The Peruvian army is simultaneously involved in a new social "mission"--the fight against poverty--and in the creation of mass political organizations. Similarly, the Mexican military's participation in literacy campaigns gives it both a high civic profile and the opportunity to establish informal ties with local *políticos*, party bosses, and even community leaders. In Brazil, where the armed forces have traditionally been depicted as the nation's "civilizers," soldiers provide on-site health services. In Ecuador and Peru, personnel stationed in frontier communities are able to develop patron-client linkages. <sup>18</sup>

Accompanying these civic action projects by the armed forces is a troubling public discourse that recasts socioeconomic and collective action problems--poverty, migration waves, displaced workers, and ecological degradation--as "threats to national security." This free-ranging national security discourse overextends the national defense agenda. Potential enemies of the nation now range from guerrillas and paramilitary organizations to drug traffickers and foreign economic competitors in a globalized market. <sup>19</sup>

Reasserting the classical distinction between public safety and national security might serve as something of a corrective to this overextension. Indeed, in an age of presumed globalization, this distinction only becomes more relevant. To retain some influence over the shape of their institutional roles and the boundaries separating their spheres of action, domestic political actors must have a clear sense of their core responsibilities and prerogatives.

Insisting on a distinction between public safety and national security is only a start, but we believe that it is a good one. The reason is as straightforward as it is old. The concept of national security remains at its core a matter of "us vs. them." Nations traditionally deploy this outward-looking concept when facing other nations as potential foes. Public safety, in contrast, is inward-looking. It aims, ideally, at the [End Page 121] establishment and preservation of legitimate order in the internal commons. In Latin American countries, reordering the internal commons would entail professionalizing the police and security forces, shoring up judicial systems, and reforming local government institutions, particularly at the municipal level. It also would require careful government regulation of joint police-military operations when responding to such transnational threats as drug trafficking.

Meeting these challenges presumes the capacity to shift resource allocation in favor of institution-building and away from the kinds of expenditures on sophisticated weaponry we discuss below. It also presupposes a recognition that public "threats" are rooted in problematic social conditions best addressed through well-rounded public policy. After all, displaced workers, migrant flows, drug trafficking, and guerrilla and paramilitary challenges to state authority are interrelated problems, ones that are exacerbated by the dislocations that attend political and economic restructuring.

These daunting problems begin to appear less daunting the moment we draw a sharp distinction between public safety and national security. For it is precisely this distinction that opens up the possibility for joint intervention by governments and civil society groups, even when elected representatives are (unduly) excluded from national security decisions. Witness the theme of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas' successful campaign for the mayoralty of Mexico's Federal District--*ciudadan-ización*, an almost untranslatable term that elicited citizens' interest in joining with elected officials to fight institutionalized graft, common criminality, and urban degradation.

## The "Toys-R-Us" School of Modernization

The possibility of mobilizing cooperation between government and civil society--and it is only a possibility--may well prove illusory. But reasserting the distinction between public safety and national security also serves another useful purpose: It calls attention to the risks of blurring the line between the two. Thinly spread among so many "security" fronts, the armed forces may appear sapped of their capability to provide for national defense. This perception, in turn, is used by the armed forces to justify high-end weapons purchases that would otherwise be precluded.

We believe, for reasons spelled out below, that this perception of weakness is detrimental to democratic development partly because of the expenditures it justifies. This claim goes against two prevailing views of military expenditures. One view has it that expensive arms acquisitions merely indicate that the region's armed forces are trying to protect their comparatively small (and diminishing) shares of the Gross Domestic Product. Another common view hinges on the notion **[End Page 122]** that by letting the military have its "toys," civilian governments can keep the generals out of politics.

The first--call it the "resource protection" view--is both inaccurate and simplistic. The region's armed forces, no doubt, do try to protect their resource allocations (in this their behavior is no different from, say, their U.S. counterparts' hesitant adjustment to the end of the Cold War). But judging from the last decade's trends in military expenditures, most of the region's militaries have managed to avoid a significant and/or secular decline in their shares of GDP. As the table above shows, a clear and sustained decrease is observable only in Argentina. (Having gorged on resources even more than the armed forces of Chile and Brazil during the years of dictatorship, the Argentine military was particularly vulnerable to budget cutting.) Colombia, unsurprisingly, actually registered clear increases in military expenditures as a percent of GDP. The trends elsewhere, as can be gleaned from the table, are markedly uneven.

The "resource protection" view, moreover, fails to capture the complex motivations behind the military's bid for greater shares. The armed forces are also driven to acquire sophisticated weapons by a genuine fear that one country's arms purchases can unsettle the regional strategic balance to the detriment of the rest. In the mid-1990s, Chile's acquisition of Scorpene submarines and Leopard-1 combat vehicles from West European suppliers, as well as Peru's rush (after its 1995 border war with Ecuador) to acquire equipment from Ukraine alarmed the Argentine Ministry of Defense. Soon a call went out for a "spiritual retreat"--a closed meeting of high-ranking defense officials and military officers.<sup>20</sup> The overriding concern at this meeting was the impact of possible shifts in the region's "strategic balance" on their country's national security.

If such reciprocal fears are commonplace in the politics of nations, they also can be destabilizing--especially to new democracies in a **[End Page 123]** region plagued by old rivalries. Argentina and Brazil, for instance, share a long history of hostility. MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common Market) may well turn out to be the alchemist that, through the logic of mutual economic gains, transforms this hostility into cooperation. But this transformation is not likely to extend to other regional players, especially Chile and Peru. Declarations by high-ranking military officers in both countries hint instead at a potential revival of old animosities in the face of regional economic integration. In Chile, Brigadier General Hugo Jaque has publicly favored the creation of an "Economic Security Division" within the armed forces in order to deal with conflicts that might arise as a direct consequence of MERCOSUR.<sup>21</sup> In Peru, General Walter Ledesma has speculated that "problems on the economic front may unleash conflict"--noting tersely that Chile's Armed Forces are already "prepared," and warning that it is not inconceivable that "the enemy is coming."<sup>22</sup>

With regard to the acquisition of arms, both transparency and trust are sorely lacking in the region. Age-old suspicions among neighboring countries are still there, in places deeply entrenched. These suspicions may push professional strategists to propose, and nationalist publics to support,

unreasonable increases in military spending, especially on high-end material.

This brings us to the the "Toys-R-Us" argument, which says: "Let the generals have their weapons and they will stay out of domestic politics." This line of reasoning is flawed on several counts. First, it justifies institutionalized intrastate extortion--not a prudent move from the perspective of democratic development. Second, the argument is reminiscent of the modernization hopes nourished in the 1950s and 1960s, which were dashed in the 1970s precisely because the armed forces graduated from playing with weapons to playing with countries. Third, elemental notions of fairness, not to mention political prudence, dictate that, barring a foreign threat to the nation, even the military must share in the sacrifices of restructuring. Fourth, even if we set aside prudence, justice, and the lessons of history, this argument is still flawed because it assumes that the region's militaries have "modernized" their worldview and therefore will be satisfied with "adequate" resource allocations.

Adequacy can be an extremely subjective concept. How much is enough? Should we, in addition, overlook the disturbing adaptive strategies used by the region's armed forces to cope with the past decade's budget cuts? Nothing in these strategies suggests that a process of military professionalization, as normally understood, is under way. Quite the contrary. Private security firms owned and managed by members of the military hardly fit the notion of a professional corps. Blurred institutional boundaries among police, security, and military forces, and the latter's hegemony, are also at odds with the broader **[End Page 124]** ideal of modernization. Equally incongruous with the image of professional armed forces is their involvement in the "war" against drug trafficking for purposes of revenue enhancement and turf-building. Nor does the military's cultivation of clientelistic support or its effective exemption from democratic rules of accountability suggest that modernization has occurred.

## Requirements for Peace and Democracy

Democratic transformation in Latin America's formal political arrangements is at once real and mesmerizing, and is thus neither to be derided nor to be taken entirely at face value. Close scrutiny of informal practices and structures is warranted. In the area of civil-military relations, these already give pause on a number of counts. To recapitulate briefly: Civil societies are resurgent, but they are also segmented and dependent on elected officials, who in turn are embedded in political structures too weak to control the creeping autonomy of the armed forces. Militaries have transgressed the boundaries that previously barred them from both entrepreneurial action and civic action, in pursuit of an expanded definition of "national security." The armed forces may well cross the increasingly blurry line between limited autonomy and a kind of feudal sovereignty.

This is no overstatement. The news is bad indeed when military expenditures as a percentage of GDP become an unreliable indicator of the armed forces' influence, because the figures tell us virtually nothing about officers' business profits and the military's institutional control of assets that are not monitored by the national *contralorias*. The news is even worse when the shocking becomes an accepted fact of life. The armed forces' profit-making and asset-accumulation are one example. The increasingly dense patron-client linkages directly connecting the military to an array of social groups are another. The list goes on, and as it grows longer, the military continues to enhance its autonomy.

Neither the established democracies of the West nor the citizens of Latin America's democracies can afford to ignore these new forms of military autonomy. The stability of regional peace and the quality of the region's democracies are simultaneously at stake. To support both peace and democracy, three requirements must be met. First, resurgent civil societies must take an active interest in things military. Second, democratic political actors must develop and exercise ministerial, legislative, and party-based oversight capabilities vis-'a-vis the military. And third, major established democracies, particularly the United States, must prove willing and able to implement policies conducive to achieving the first two goals. It is not clear that any of these requirements is being met. If anything, we detect trends in the opposite direction. In **[End Page 125]** the midst of political and economic restructuring, it may seem too much to ask for greater and more responsible involvement in issues of

civil-military relations by all parties concerned. The alternative, however, is to risk losing a great deal of what has been accomplished in the last two decades by democracy-builders in Latin America.

Consuelo Cruz is assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, where she also teaches at the School of International and Public Affairs. She has previously served as director of Columbia University's Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies. Rut Diamint is professor of political science at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and coordinator of "The Civil-Military Issue in Latin America," a Ford Foundation-sponsored project at the Universidad Torcuato di Tella. Between 1993 and 1996 she was an advisor on policy and strategy to Argentina's Ministry of Defense.

## Notes

1. The concept of the "living museum" was developed by Charles Anderson. See his "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics," in Howard Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), 245.

2. For Chile, see Claudio Fuentes, "Militares en Chile: ni completa autonomía, ni total subordinación," in *Chile 96: Análisis y Opiniones* (Santiago: Nueva Serie, FLACSO, 1997). For Brazil, see Braz Araujo, *Novos Padroes de pensamento estratégico no Brasil* (São Paulo: Nucleo de Políticas y Estrategias de Universidad de São Paulo, 1993). For Ecuador, see Fernando Bustamante, "Las fuerzas armadas ecuatorianas y la coyuntura político-social del fin de siglo," paper prepared for the project "La cuestión cívico-militar en las nuevas democracias de América Latina," Universidad Torcuato Di Tella-Ford Foundation. For Paraguay, see José Luis Simón, *Política Internacional para la democracia* (Asunción: Fundación Hans Seidel, 1995).

3. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

4. Jo-Marie Burt, "Political Violence in Lima," in Douglas Chalmers et al., eds., *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 298-99.

5. Alfred Stepan, cited in Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, "State-Sponsored Violence in Brazil," in Douglas Chalmers et al., eds., *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America*, 273.

6. See the *New York Times*, 22 August 1996; *O Globo* (São Paulo) 9 August 1997, 7; *Folha de São Paulo*, 10 August 1997, 17.

7. In Brazil and Chile, the Armed Forces control "mixed enterprises" in "strategic" industries, notably chemicals and aerospace. These have not been generally regarded as problematic by the private sector. But the military's political clout tends to foment opportunistic behavior within these firms (the extreme case being that of Pinochet's son during his father's government).

8. See Colonel Alberto Molina Flores, "Las Fuerzas Armadas Ecuatorianas, Paz y Desarrollo," ALDHU, Quito, Ecuador, 1993. Cited in Fernando Bustamante, *Las Fuerzas Armadas ecuatorianas y la coyuntura político social del fin de siglo*. (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella-Ford Foundation Project "The Civil-Military Issue in Latin America: Training a Civil Network of Specialists," forthcoming).

9. For the first time in the country's history, the chief of Nicaragua's army presented a report to the Contralor de la República revealing possession of a fund of several million dollars accumulated through private, semi-private, and state enterprises, over which the military qua institution claims not to have majority control. *Diálogo Centroamericano* 21 (June 1997): 7.

10. Kai Ambos, "Razones del fracaso del combate internacional a las drogas," in *Contribuciones, Seguridad Jurídica y Desarrollo Económico*, CIEDLA, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, No. 3, 1997,



11. For Brazil, see *Folha de São Paulo*, 10 August 1997, 17. For Peru, see *IDEELE, Revista del Instituto de Defensa Legal*, No. 102, November 1997, 21. Also refer to the November 1997 issue of *IDEELE* for General Walter Ledesma's assertion that when drug traffickers deploy instruments that outstrip police capabilities, the Armed Forces must step in.

12. Fabio L.S. Petrarolha, "Brazil: The Meek Want the Earth Now," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 52 (November-December, 1996): 20-29.

13. Stephen Fidler, "Forces to be reckoned with," *Financial Times*, 17 September 1997.

14. Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *América Latina: Gasto Militar--Actores Claves--Proceso de Decisión* (Chile: FLACSO, 1994), 28-37.

15. See Rolando Ames, "Las Políticas de seguridad en el Perú," and José Luis Simón, "La toma de decisión en defensa en Paraguay," in Rut Diamint, ed., "La toma de decisión en asuntos de seguridad," Working Paper, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, No. 39, May 1997.

16. Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, "A Conversation with the Leaders of the Mexican Opposition," statement delivered at New York University's Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 21 November 1997.

17. Interview with Elizúr Arteaga, Professor of Constitutional Law, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, *Proceso*, 10 August 1997, 18-19.

18. Fernando Rospigliosi, "Las fuerzas armadas que necesitamos," in *IDEELE, Revista del Instituto de Defensa Legal*, No. 102, November 1997, 15.

19. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* 76 (January-February 1997): 51-52; and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 14.

20. *El País* (Madrid), 11 February 1997; and *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 10 May 1997.

21. *El Mercurio* (Santiago), 13 May 1996.

22. *IDEELE, Revista del Instituto de Defensa Legal*, No. 102, November 1997, 22.

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